We cover TrueOS/Lumina working to be less dependent on Linux, How the IllumOS network stack works, Throttling the password gropers & the 64 bit inode call for testing.
Operating system focus is key. What OS is the project originally designed for? This determines how the “upstream” dependencies list appears and which “heartbeat” to monitor.
Evolution of PC-BSD, Lumina, and TrueOS. With these principles in mind – let's look at PC-BSD, Lumina, and TrueOS.
The Rename and Next Steps
With all of these changes and the lack of a clear “upgrade” path from PC-BSD to the new systems, we decided it was necessary to change the project itself (name and all). To us, this was the only way to ensure people were aware of the differences, and that TrueOS really is a different kind of project from PC-BSD. Note this was not a “hostile takeover” of the PC-BSD project by rabid FreeBSD fanatics. This was more a refocusing of the PC-BSD project into something that could ensure longevity and reliability for the foreseeable future.
Does TrueOS have bugs and issues? Of course! That is the nature of “rolling” with upstream changes all the time. Not only do you always get the latest version of something (a good thing), you also find yourself on the “front line” for finding and reporting bugs in those same applications (a bad thing if you like consistency or stability). What you are also seeing is just how much “churn” happens in the open-source ecosystem at any given time.
We are devoted to providing our users (and ourselves – don’t forget we use TrueOS every day too!) a stable, reliable, and secure experience. Please be patient as we continue striving toward this goal in the best way possible, not just doing what works for the moment, but the project’s future too.
While preparing material for the upcoming BSDCan PF and networking tutorial, I realized that the pop3 gropers were actually not much fun to watch anymore. So I used the traffic shaping features of my OpenBSD firewall to let the miscreants inflict some pain on themselves. Watching logs became fun again.
The actual useful parts of this article follow - take this as a walkthrough of how to mitigate a wide range of threats and annoyances.
First, analyze the behavior that you want to defend against. In our case that's fairly obvious: We have a service that's getting a volume of unwanted traffic, and looking at our logs the attempts come fairly quickly with a number of repeated attempts from each source address.
I've written about the rapid-fire ssh bruteforce attacks and their mitigation before (and of course it's in The Book of PF) as well as the slower kind where those techniques actually come up short. The traditional approach to ssh bruteforcers has been to simply block their traffic, and the state-tracking features of PF let you set up overload criteria that add the source addresses to the table that holds the addresses you want to block.
For the system that runs our pop3 service, we also have a PF ruleset in place with queues for traffic shaping. For some odd reason that ruleset is fairly close to the HFSC traffic shaper example in The Book of PF, and it contains a queue that I set up mainly as an experiment to annoy spammers (as in, the ones that are already for one reason or the other blacklisted by our spamd).
The queue is defined like this:
queue spamd parent rootq bandwidth 1K min 0K max 1K qlimit 300
yes, that's right. A queue with a maximum throughput of 1 kilobit per second. I have been warned that this is small enough that the code may be unable to strictly enforce that limit due to the timer resolution in the HFSC code. But that didn't keep me from trying.
Now a few small additions to the ruleset are needed for the good to put the evil to the task. We start with a table to hold the addresses we want to mess with. Actually, I'll add two, for reasons that will become clear later:
table persist counters
table persist counters
The rules that use those tables are:
block drop log (all) quick frompass in quick log (all) on egress proto tcp from to port pop3 flags S/SA keep state \
(max-src-conn 2, max-src-conn-rate 3/3, overload flush global, pflow) set queue spamdpass in log (all) on egress proto tcp to port pop3 flags S/SA keep state \
(max-src-conn 5, max-src-conn-rate 6/3, overload flush global, pflow)
The last one lets anybody connect to the pop3 service, but any one source address can have only open five simultaneous connections and at a rate of six over three seconds.
The results were immediately visible. Monitoring the queues using pfctl -vvsq shows the tiny queue works as expected:
queue spamd parent rootq bandwidth 1K, max 1K qlimit 300
[ pkts: 196136 bytes: 12157940 dropped pkts: 398350 bytes: 24692564 ]
[ qlength: 300/300 ]
[ measured: 2.0 packets/s, 999.13 b/s ]
and looking at the pop3 daemon's log entries, a typical encounter looks like this:
Apr 19 22:39:33 skapet spop3d[44875]: connect from 111.181.52.216
Apr 19 22:39:33 skapet spop3d[75112]: connect from 111.181.52.216
Apr 19 22:39:34 skapet spop3d[57116]: connect from 111.181.52.216
Apr 19 22:39:34 skapet spop3d[65982]: connect from 111.181.52.216
Apr 19 22:39:34 skapet spop3d[58964]: connect from 111.181.52.216
Apr 19 22:40:34 skapet spop3d[12410]: autologout time elapsed - 111.181.52.216
Apr 19 22:40:34 skapet spop3d[63573]: autologout time elapsed - 111.181.52.216
Apr 19 22:40:34 skapet spop3d[76113]: autologout time elapsed - 111.181.52.216
Apr 19 22:40:34 skapet spop3d[23524]: autologout time elapsed - 111.181.52.216
Apr 19 22:40:34 skapet spop3d[16916]: autologout time elapsed - 111.181.52.216
here the miscreant comes in way too fast and only manages to get five connections going before they're shunted to the tiny queue to fight it out with known spammers for a share of bandwidth.
One important takeaway from this, and possibly the most important point of this article, is that it does not take a lot of imagination to retool this setup to watch for and protect against undesirable activity directed at essentially any network service.
You pick the service and the ports it uses, then figure out what are the parameters that determine what is acceptable behavior. Once you have those parameters defined, you can choose to assign to a minimal queue like in this example, block outright, redirect to something unpleasant or even pass with a low probability.
Inodes are data structures corresponding to objects in a file system, such as files and directories. FreeBSD has historically used 32-bit values to identify inodes, which limits file systems to somewhat under 232 objects. Many modern file systems internally use 64-bit identifiers and FreeBSD needs to follow suit to properly and fully support these file systems.
The 64-bit inode project, also known as ino64, started life many years ago as a project by Gleb Kurtsou (gleb@). After that time several people have had a hand in updating it and addressing regressions, after mckusick@ picked up and updated the patch, and acted as a flag-waver.
FreeBSD digital audio workstation, or DAW for short, is now possible. At this very moment it's not user friendly that much, but you'll manage. What I want to say is that I worked on porting some of the audio apps to FreeBSD, met some other people interested in porting audio stuff and became heavily involved with DrumGizmo - drum sampling engine. Let me start with the basic setup.
FreeBSD doesn't have hard real-time support, but it's pretty close. For the needs of audio, FreeBSD's implementation of real-time is sufficient and, in my opinion, superior to the one you can get on Linux with RT path (which is ugly, not supported by distributions and breaks apps like VirtualBox). As default install of FreeBSD is concerned with real-time too much, we have to tweak sysctl a bit, so append this to your /etc/sysctl.conf:
kern.timecounter.alloweddeviation=0
hw.usb.uaudio.buffer_ms=2 # only on -STABLE for now
hw.snd.latency=0
kern.coredump=0
With this setup I can play OSS, JACK and PulseAudio sound all at the same time, which I was not able to do on Linux.
In FreeBSD, there is a built-in DNS server called Unbound.
So why would run a local DNS server? I am in a region where internet traffic is still a bit expensive, that also implies slow, and high response times. To speed that a up a little, you can use own DNS server. It will speed up because for every homepage you visit, there will be several hooks to other domains: commercials, site components, and links to other sites. These, will now all be cached locally on your new DNS server. In my case I use an old PC-Engine Alix board for my home DNS server, but you can use almost everything, Raspberry Pi, old laptop/desktop and others. As long as it runs FreeBSD.
The Web is replete with tutorial-style content on how to accomplish programming tasks. Unfortunately, even top-ranked tutorials suffer from severe security vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting (XSS), and SQL injection (SQLi). Assuming that these tutorials influence real-world software development, we hypothesize that code snippets from popular tutorials can be used to bootstrap vulnerability discovery at scale. To validate our hypothesis, we propose a semi-automated approach to find recurring vulnerabilities starting from a handful of top-ranked tutorials that contain vulnerable code snippets. We evaluate our approach by performing an analysis of tens of thousands of open-source web applications to check if vulnerabilities originating in the selected tutorials recur.
Our analysis framework has been running on a standard PC, analyzed 64,415 PHP codebases hosted on GitHub thus far, and found a total of 117 vulnerabilities that have a strong syntactic similarity to vulnerable code snippets present in popular tutorials. In addition to shedding light on the anecdotal belief that programmers reuse web tutorial code in an ad hoc manner, our study finds disconcerting evidence of insufficiently reviewed tutorials compromising the security of open-source projects. Moreover, our findings testify to the feasibility of large-scale vulnerability discovery using poorly written tutorials as a starting point
As version 1.3.0 of the Lumina desktop starts getting closer to release, I want to take a couple weeks and give you all some sneak peaks at some of the changes/updates that we have been working on (and are in the process of finishing up).
This highlights one the big things that I love about Lumina: it gives you an interface that is custom-tailored to YOUR needs/wants – rather than expecting YOU to change your routines to accomodate how some random developer/designer across the world thinks everybody should use a computer.
This is a small utility designed to provide the ability for the user to play audio and video files on the local system, as well as stream audio from online sources. For now, only the Pandora internet radio service is supported via the “pianobar” CLI utility, which is an optional runtime dependency. However, we hope to gradually add new streaming sources over time.
For a long time I had been using another Pandora streaming client on my TrueOS desktop, but it was very fragile with respect to underlying changes: LibreSSL versions for example. The player would regularly stop functioning for a few update cycles until a version of LibreSSL which was “compatible” with the player was used. After enduring this for some time, I was finally frustrated enough to start looking for alternatives.
A co-worker pointed me to a command-line utility called “pianobar“, which was also a small client for Pandora radio. After using pianobar for a couple weeks, I was impressed with how stable it was and how little “overhead” it required with regards to extra runtime dependencies. Of course, I started thinking “I could write a Qt5 GUI for that!”. Once I had a few free hours, I started writing what became lumina-mediaplayer. I started with the interface to pianobar itself to see how complicated it would be to interact with, but after a couple days of tinkering in my spare time, I realized I had a full client to Pandora radio basically finished.